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Introduction 
 
In intend to illustrate the modern application of the Roman fiducia cum creditore 
(Sicherungsübereignung) by reference to a recent South African case in which the 
doctrine of fiduciary transfer of ownership of movables was rejected.1 South Africa 
has a mixed legal system that combines civilian and common law principles. Since 
English law influence is strongest in the commercial fields, South Africa has taken 
over most of the English pseudo security institutions such as reservation of ownership, 
hire purchase and sale and leaseback transactions and endeavoured to adapt them to 
civil law principles.  
 
The recent South African case, Nedcor Bank Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd2deals with a dispute 
between two financing institutions (financiers) concerning the financing of the 
purchase of motor vehicles by a motor dealer from a supplier. Retailers, traders and 
motorcar dealers often need to buy their stock (in this case the fleet of motor cars in 
the showroom) on credit. The provider of this credit typically desires real security. 
Since the supplier (the car factory) is not usually geared for the business of providing 
such credit, numerous financial institutions have mushroomed to cater for this 
financial need. The motor dealer is not averse to providing the security in the form of 
his movable stock (fleet of motor cars) as long as it does not interfere unduly with the 
profitable carrying on of his business. This was exactly what the motor dealer 
purported to do in the South African case. The purpose of this presentation is to 
explain the business context and the legal position in South Africa after this decision 
and to see what lessons can be learned from it generally. 
 
Business and legal context 
 
In the South African case a financier, Nedcor Bank provided finance to a motor-dealer 
through a so-called ‘floor plan’ or master agreement that regulates the provision of 
security for a supply of motorcars via retention of ownership.3 In this particular case, 
the master agreement distinguished between two scenarios. In the first scenario the 
supplier sells batches of new cars to the financier who in turn sells them to the motor 
dealer. In such a case where the financier is also the seller of the motorcars, a long-
standing security device is readily available in South African and English law for the 
                                                 
1  For a more detailed examination of South African cases on this topic, see VAN DER 
MERWE, SMITH, Financing the Purchase of Stock by the Transfer of Ownership as 
Security: A Simulated Transaction? Stellenbosch Law Review, 1999, 303ss. 
2  1998 2 SA 830 (W). 
3  See GOODE, Commercial law, 2° ed., London 1995, 795-796 and 798-800. 
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provision of security, namely retention of ownership of the cars. Possession of the 
property is transferred to the motor dealer, but ownership is retained by the 
seller/financier until full payment of the purchase price. The transfer of the motor 
vehicles on credit with reservation of ownership is usually effected through a sale 
transaction. In many cases the parties will use a lease transaction, or a hire-purchase 
transaction (a lease with an option to purchase at the end of the term) instead. For 
most movables, these transactions are basically interchangeable in economic terms as 
long as the term of the lease or hire approximates the useful life of the movable in 
question. The choice is usually dictated by a combination of commercial practice, 
differences in applicable legislation, and tax considerations.  
 
In most cases the financier will be some kind of financial institution that is not 
actually in the business of selling stock to traders. The transaction must therefore be 
structured in a certain way. The seller of the stock (supplier) sells for cash to the 
financier at the same wholesale price, which would have been offered to the trader. 
The financier is then in a position to sell on credit to the trader, retaining ownership as 
security. The sale to the trader is at a price that allows the financier to recover its 
outlay plus a margin of profit for the provision of the finance. The price will be 
payable by the trader upon resale to a sub-buyer, possibly within a time limit built in 
to protect the financier if goods cannot be sold. The expectation of the parties is that 
the price of the sub-sale would be such as to allow the trader to pay the debt to the 
financier and still retain some margin of profit for his own business. 
 
Since the motor dealer holds the goods in question (motor vehicles) as stock for 
resale, the whole point of the excise and the practical business expectation of the 
parties are that the trader will sell the goods on to some sub-purchaser. In legal terms, 
it makes no difference whether the goods in question (motor vehicles) are held by the 
trader (motor dealer) as stock for resale or are to be kept indefinitely by the trader. In 
practical business terms, it does make a difference, because if the goods are held as 
stock for resale, then the whole point of the exercise and the expectation of both 
parties is that the trader will sell the goods on to some sub-purchaser. Only by making 
such a sub-sale would the trader be in a position to pay the debt he has incurred in 
acquiring the goods. This makes the financier’s position precarious. If the trader sells 
the stock in the course of his business, as he is expected to do, the ultimate buyer will 
normally acquire ownership and so the financier’s real security will be lost. This is so 
if the trader in terms of the agreement had the financier’s authority to dispose of the 
goods. Even if such authority is not present and the trader acted in breach of the 
agreement, principles of estoppel or ostensible authority might allow the trader to 
transfer ownership or at least to estop the financier from claiming the return of the 
goods. There is no mechanism in South African law that would allow the financier’s 
interest to be transferred to the proceeds of the sub-sale held by the trader. The 
practical implication is that the financier of stock needs to monitor the conduct of the 
trader’s business to ensure that as stock is sold, the corresponding debt is paid out of 
the proceeds. If this system is not followed, the financier can rapidly become 
undersecured. 
 
However, this transactional structure will not fit all the cases in which stock needs to 
be acquired by the trader (motor-dealer). This is illustrated by the Nedcor Bank case 
where the floor plan attempted to cover not only the situation in which the trader 
acquired new cars from car manufacturers (suppliers), but also a second scenario 
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where the trader acquired a single used car from some other source. In the Nedcor 
Bank case the motor dealer had acquired the car from another car dealer thus a single 
unit and not a batch of new cars and obviously not so well planned in advance. The 
floor plan also covered the case where the motor dealer acquires a used car from a 
customer as part exchange for a new car. Business proficiency requires that the trader 
acts quickly when these opportunities arise, and it is not practicable to structure the 
transaction as a sale to the motor dealer’s financier followed by a sale to the trader 
with the retention of ownership. 
 
The floor plan in question therefore contemplated another transactional structure to 
cater for this second scenario. This was that the motor-dealer already having become 
the owner of the car, should sell them to the financier, at the same price, which the 
dealer had paid. In this case the transfer of ownership to the financier occurs without 
physical delivery and therefore has to rely on the institution of constitutum 
possessorium, leaving the car with the dealer for further sale. Following that the 
system works as above. The financier resold to the motor-dealer on retention of 
ownership terms, thus giving the financier real security for the debt. The dispute arose 
because the motor-dealer had then sold the car to a retail buyer, (the ultimate buyer); 
more precisely it had purported to transfer ownership to the ultimate buyer’s financier, 
the plaintiff Bank (Absa Bank) that then sold the car to the ultimate buyer with 
retention of ownership. On the default of payment by the ultimate buyer, the plaintiff 
(Absa Bank) sought to assert ownership of the car. Presumably the motor-dealer failed 
to pay the first financier (Nedcor Bank) the debt owing for this car, because the first 
financier also claimed to own the car. 
  
The court decided, however, that the transaction between the motor dealer and the 
first financier (Nedcor Bank) was a ‘simulated transaction’: the parties had attempted 
to create a loan secured by a pledge, but possession of the goods had not been 
transferred to the creditor. The attempt to transfer the motorcar to the first financier 
(Nedcor Bank) was therefore without legal effect and as a result the second financier 
(Absa Bank) prevailed. 
 
Simulated transactions and structured transactions 
 
The judge acknowledged that the commercial practice of extending credit under floor 
plans was practised in South Africa since the 1960’s.4 Still he found that the 
transaction was simulated in that it amounted to an attempt to create a non-possessory 
pledge, which is not recognised in South African law. He accepted that some reform 
might be desirable, but he regarded it as improper for a judge of first instance to 
recognise in effect a new form of security. 
 
I shall consider first the notion of a simulated transaction and especially the question 
when a structured transaction becomes a simulated transaction, and so crosses the line 
from the permitted to the prohibited. Then I shall turn to the particular context of 
financing the acquisition of stock and consider whether the line between permitted 
and prohibited makes sense in policy terms or whether it is dictated by purely 
doctrinal considerations that should perhaps yield to matters of policy. 
 
                                                 
4  At 838G. 
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Simulated transactions 
 
What is a simulated transaction? As a general rule parties to a contract express 
themselves in a language calculated without concealment or subterfuge to embody the 
agreement at which they have arrived. They intend the contract to be exactly what it 
purports.  Not infrequently, however, the parties to a transaction endeavour to conceal 
its real character either to secure some advantage the law would otherwise not give, or 
to escape some disability that otherwise the law would impose. They call it a name or 
give it a shape, intended not to express but to disguise its true nature. A court can only 
give effect to what the transaction really is not what in form it purports to be 
according to the maxim: plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur. Thus 
a transaction that in form purports to be a sale while the parties actually intends a 
pledge is a simulated transaction.5 But the court must be satisfied that there is a real 
intention definitely ascertainable, which differs from the simulated intention. If the 
parties intend the contract to have its purported effect, the fact that the same object 
might have been attained in another way will not necessarily make the arrangement 
other than it purports to be. The inquiry in each case is thus one of fact. According to 
the old Roman-Dutch authority, Perezius6 simulations can be detected by considering 
the facts leading up to the contract and by taking account of any unusual provisions 
embodied in it.7 
 
This view of the Highest Court in South Africa expressed in 1910 corresponds with 
the position of the English Court of Appeal in Welsh Development Agency v Export 
Finance Co Ltd, 8 decided in 1992. The English court also accepted that the court 
looks to the agreement that the parties have reached and not directly to the economic 
effects of that agreement.9 The parties are in principle free to use some transaction 
even though another transaction, which might be more suitable, would have had the 
same economic effect. Thus there are many ways of raising cash besides borrowing. If 
in form it is not a loan, it is not to the point to say that its object was to raise money or 
that the parties could have produced the same result more conveniently by borrowing 
and lending money.10 According to the Lord Justice the (simulated) transaction can be 
approached11 in two ways namely by the external and the internal route.12 In the 
external route one attempts to show that the parties’ formal agreement (written 
                                                 
5  See Staughton LJ at 185: ‘disguise, cloak, mask, colourable device, label, form, 
artificial, sham, strategem and pretence.’ 
6  PEREZIUS, Praelectiones in Codicem Justiniani, Amstelodami 1645, ad Codex 4 22 
2. 
7  This is a paraphrase of a remark by Innes JA (as he then was) in Zandberg v Van Zyl 
1910 AD 302 at 309. 
8  1992 BCLC 148, 1992 BCC 270. 
9  See the Crowther Committee’s Report on Consumer Credit (Cmnd 4596 (1971) para 
1.3.6 quoted by Staughton LJ at 186 
10  Staughton LJ quoted Lord Devlin in the Privy Council case of Chow Yoong Hong v 
Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory Ltd 1962 AC 209,216; 1961 3 All ER 1163, 1167: 
‘There are many ways of raising cash besides borrowing… If in form it is a loan, it is 
not to the point to say that its object was to raise money for one of them or that the 
parties could have produced the same result more conveniently by borrowing and 
lending money.’ 
11  GOODE, Commercial Law 2° ed., London (1995) 646-651 calls this the process of 
‘characterisation of the transaction’. 
12  At 186. 
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document) does not actually reflect the agreement of the parties. In an attempt to 
generate or avoid some legal consequence, they execute a contract and they conduct 
their affairs in a manner, which does not correspond with that contract. Their common 
intention is to be bound by different terms. In such a case the parties should not be 
surprised to find that the court calls it a sham, a cloak or device and does not give 
effect to the terms of the contract. By contrast, if one follows the internal route, one 
looks solely at the written agreement in order to ascertain from its terms whether it 
amounts to a transaction of the legal nature, which the parties ascribe to it. In the 
internal route, the parties intend to be bound by the agreement they have made, but the 
question is whether that agreement has the legal effects, which the parties intend it to 
have. In this sense the term ‘simulated transaction’ does not refer to a ‘sham, a cloak 
or a device’, but to the situation (as in Nedcor Bank) where the parties intend to be 
bound by their agreement, but nonetheless find that it does not have the legal effects 
they desired. 
 
Once the matter is so confined, it becomes clear that the idea of a simulated 
transaction is little more than a conclusion as to what is permitted. The decision in 
Nedcor Bank was that a transfer of ownership to secure a loan was a simulated 
transaction. But transfers of ownership to secure debts are not always considered to be 
so. The English common law mortgage of an immovable was a transfer of the 
mortgagor’s estate in land to the mortgagee, as security for a debt. In South African 
law, cession in securitatem debiti (Sicherungszession) is a similar transaction: an 
incorporeal movable (debt or claim) is ceded (assigned) to the creditor to secure a 
debt.13 Viewed in an abstract way, both of these examples are just as artificial as the 
transfer of ownership of corporeal movables for security: the parties do not really 
intend an outright transfer of the asset, but only the transfer of a security interest. But 
in the case of the English mortgage and the South African cession in securitatem 
debiti (Sicherungszession), the transfer is not considered simulated; this simply means 
there is no objection to it on policy reasons, and so it was judicially allowed. There 
was no objection to the English law mortgage of an immovable because the 
mortgagee would acquire the title documents and so, even though the mortgagor 
remained in occupation, there was no fear that third parties could be deceived through 
a subsequent attempt to encumber or transfer the asset. So too in the case of cession in 
securitatem debiti: the encumbered asset being incorporeal, it is not the case that the 
debtor remains in possession of it with the possibility of working deceit on subsequent 
parties. 
 
Once we take the transfer of ownership as security for a loan as evidenced in the 
Nedcor Bank case outside the domain of the sham, cloak or deceit, then an inquiry 
into the real intention of the parties or whether there was any subterfuge seems 
meaningless. What the parties intend in such a case is the following: the financier 
wants the strongest security interest that the law will allow him to take. The motor 
dealer is willing to give any security interest that the law will allow him to give, as 
long as this does not prevent him from carrying on his business and from taking the 
economic benefit of the sub-sale that he hopes to effect. This is their intention and 
                                                 
13  The other view is that cession in securitatem debiti is an outright transfer of an 
incorporeal and not a kind of pledge. See generally, VAN DER MERWE, Sakereg 2 ° 
ed., Durban 1989, 673-688; KLEYN, BORAINE, Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property 3° ed., Durban 1992, 458-461. 
 PREPRINT 
6 
reasoning based on the parties’ intention cannot go beyond that. The concept of 
‘simulated transaction’ thus means little more than ‘prohibited or non-permissible 
transaction’. With the advice of their lawyers the parties then attempt to find a means 
to give legal effect to those intentions. They may try to do it by the transfer of 
ownership as security. If the law allows this as is the case in under German law, then 
that is how the parties want to ‘structure their transaction’. If it does not, the term 
‘prohibited transaction’ (in stead of ‘simulated transaction’) is preferable and 
presumably the parties will try something else in future. Nor is it fruitful to frame the 
enquiry in terms of ‘unusual provisions’. If the transaction is allowed, however 
unusual it may seem initially, other parties will adopt it and it will become common 
form. One of the marks of a good transaction lawyer is to be able to innovate new 
transactional structures for new commercial needs.  
 
In substance one might as well go directly to what is permitted. The first part of the 
floor plan in Nedcor Bank that applied to the acquisition of a batch of new cars, 
envisaged the transfer of ownership from the manufacturer (supplier) to the financier, 
which then sells to the trader on retention of ownership terms. Looked at by the light 
of reason, the whole transaction is a simulation; it is artificially structured so as to get 
ownership in the hands of the financier. Next consider the second part of the floor 
plan namely where a single car was acquired from another motor-dealer. Here the 
motor dealer acquires ownership, albeit briefly, and then transfers it to the financier. 
The first scenario is generally accepted as effective; the second scenario is now said to 
be ineffective as a simulation. But the intention of the parties is the same in each case: 
that the financier shall have a real security in the car while the trader shall have 
possession of it to permit him to sell it. This lies outside the ‘external route’: there is 
no pretence or disguise by the parties and so there is no real enquiry except as to what 
the law permits. This must be informed by doctrine, and, within the limits of 
flexibility allowed to the judicial development of the law, by policy. 
 
Policy considerations 
 
Similar to judicial authority in other legal systems, the South African courts have 
never expressed any policy objection to real security in movables as such.14 Thus 
every legal system allows some forms of real security in movables. The real issue is 
why some forms are permissible and others are not.  
 
The most serious concern centres on publicity.15 The existence of real security must 
be discoverable by other parties; it should to a certain extent be manifest to the outside 
world. A real security that is not easy to detect can work unjustifiable hardship on a 
number of parties. These include a buyer of the asset subject to the security interest, 
who assumes that he will become the outright owner of the asset; a subsequent 
secured creditor who takes a real security right in the thing, on the assumption that the 
entire value of the thing is at his disposal for satisfaction of his claim; and a 
subsequent unsecured creditor of the debtor who may rely on the debtor’s apparent 
                                                 
14  See e.g. BEBCHUK, FRIED, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, Yale Law Journal, 1996, 857ss. who illustrated that  real security by way 
of movables is notoriously difficult to justify theoretically. 
15  South African Law Commission Report on the Giving of Security by Means of 
Movable Property Project 46 par 2 1 14. 
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prosperity as sufficient security, while the debtor’s assets are invisibly encumbered in 
favour of another creditor.  
 
Real security rights in immovables are publicised by registration in the land register. 
Note that the South African Deeds Registries Act prohibits the registration of the 
transfer of immovables as security.16  For publicity of real security rights in movables, 
South African law essentially requires actual possession by the holder of the security 
right. Although constitutum possessorium is recognised for the transfer of ownership, 
it is frowned upon when utilised for the creation of a pledge. In a pledge transaction, 
the debtor transfers possession of the thing to the creditor.17 Where a lien arises by 
operation of law, this depends upon possession by the creditor.18 Either way, the 
debtor is out of possession and so not in a position to mislead subsequent third parties. 
But the debtor rather than the creditor might want to be in possession of the thing. 
When consumers buy things on credit, it is usually so that they can have the use of 
them immediately. Likewise the motor dealer must be in possession of his stock (fleet 
of motor cars) in order to run his business successfully. His whole business depends 
on a quick sale of these assets. The economic benefit of being able to use these assets, 
as security for more financing is obvious: he can purchase even more stock. 
  
From a policy perspective the law had been inconsistent in allowing the use of 
retention of ownership as a form of real security. This transaction, which allows the 
debtor to possess the thing while giving the creditor a security right in the object, 
clearly violates the principle of publicity. The doctrinal explanation for the difference 
is that while ownership can be used as a kind of security right, it is not really a 
security right but the most extensive real right that there is. The seller begins the 
transaction as owner, and the parties simply stipulate for the postponement in the 
transfer of ownership.19 But of course the terms of the contract are such that all of the 
                                                 
16  Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 s 91: ‘No transfer of land and no cession of any 
registered lease or sub-lease or other real right in land except a mortgage made as 
security for a debt or other obligation shall be attested by any registrar or registered in 
any deeds registry.’ 
17  See VAN DER MERWE, Sakereg 2° ed., Durban, 655-660. 
18  See the authorities cited by VAN DER MERWE, Sakereg 2° ed., Durban, 721 n 903. 
19  In Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG 1991 AC 339, 1990 3 WLR 810; 1990 3 All 
ER 481, the House of Lords held in an appeal from Scotland the retained ownership 
was not a security interest. At 353-354: ‘Here the appellants by the terms of the 
contract of sale, have in effect reserved the right of disposal of the steel strips until 
fulfilment of the condition that all debts due to them by Carron (manufacturers of 
metal, plastic and general engineering products: respondents joint receivers on 
Carron’s assets) have been paid. By virtue of this enactment that has the effect that 
the property in the goods did not pass to Carron until that condition had been fulfilled. 
Counsel for Carron argued that the words ‘conditions’ in s 19(1) must be read as 
excluding any condition which has the effect of creating a right of security over the 
goods. I am, however, unable to regard a provision reserving title to the seller until 
payment of all debts due by him by the buyer as amounting to the creation by the 
buyer of a right of security in favour of the seller. Such a provision does in a sense 
give the seller security for the unpaid debts of the buyer. But it does so by way of 
legitimate retention of title, not be virtue of any right over his property conferred by 
the buyer.’ And again at 355: ‘The contract of sale did not attempt to create a right of 
security in favour of the appellants, rather did it operate to transfer possession and 
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economic benefits of the thing are transferred to the buyer, and the seller’s retained 
ownership is stripped down to what, in economic terms, is a security right. Does this 
mean that since the publicity principle is violated, retention of ownership is a 
‘simulated transaction’, an attempt to create a pledge without possession, and so 
impermissible?20 Only the Scottish Court of Session has taken this position but was 
overruled in the House of Lords. In some jurisdictions, the lack of publicity has led to 
statutory intervention, in Canada as early as 188221 requiring either registration in a 
public register or the marking of goods in the owner’s (seller’s) name. 
 
But once the facts depart too far from the straightforward retention of ownership, 
policy considerations will assert itself. If the financier buys stock from the 
manufacturer and then sells it to the trader with retention of ownership this seems 
acceptable even though the acquisition of ownership by the financier is purely for 
security reasons. If this transaction were branded as simulated, no financier who was 
not the original seller of the thing could finance the purchase of it by retaining a real 
security right in the thing, while still leaving the buyer (motor dealer) in possession. 
This transactional structure is used very often in South Africa and in England both at 
the consumer and at the wholesale level.22  In Nedcor Bank case, these were the terms 
on which the trader acquired new car stock and these were the terms on which the 
ultimate purchaser’s financier attempted to acquire the car in dispute.23 
 
However, the line appears to be drawn if the debtor (trader, dealer) once acquires 
ownership as is the case in the second scenario where the motor dealer first buys from 
another dealer or acquires the car as (part) exchange for another sale. This is also the 
position in English law as illustrated by the 1990 English case Re Curtain Dream 
plc.24 In this case a carpet trader wanted to borrow money from the financier on the 
security of stock (carpets) already owned by the trader. There was a transfer of 
ownership to the financier under a cash sale at the price, which the trader had paid for 
the stock. Then there was a sale back to the trader with reservation of ownership, the 
price payable in instalments. The trader became insolvent and the administrator in 
insolvency (receivers) argued that these transactions taken together amounted to the 
creation of an equitable security charge over the goods (a non-possessory pledge in 
South African terms)25 requiring registration in English law, which was extant in this 
                                                                                                                                            
dominium in two stages. Until the conditions of clause I.3(1) were satisfied (full 
payment) dominium remained in the appellants.’  
20  The Second Division of the Scottish court of Session in Amour v Thyssen 
Edelstahlwerke AG took the view that clause I.3(1) amounted to an ineffective 
attempt to create a right of security over moveables without the transfer of possession 
thereof.’ See 1991 AC 339 at 354G. 
21  See GOODE, ZIEGEL Hire-Purchase and Conditional Sale: A Comparative Survey 
of Commonwealth and American Law, London 1965, 13. 
22  DIEMONT, MARAIS, ARONSTAM The Law of Credit Agreements and Hire-
Purchase in South Africa, 4° ed., Cape Town 1982, 222-224. See also GOODE 
Commercial Law, 2° ed., London 1995, 758-759, 768-773 and 783ss. 
23  See Nedcor Bank Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd 1998 2 SA 830 (W) 832H-833A where 
counsel admitted that the dealer sold the car to the second financier that sold the car 
to the ultimate purchaser in terms of an instalment sale agreement that contained a 
reservation of ownership clause in favour of the plaintiff. 
24  1990 BCLC 925, 1990 BCC 341. 
25  See Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1917 AD 66. 
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case.26  Influenced by the references in the documentation to ‘credit line’ and to the 
payment by the carpet trader of ‘interest’, the judge agreed with the administrator in 
insolvency (receiver) that this was an unsuccessful attempt to create to a equitable 
charge over the carpets. The judge found it most significant that the sale by the trader 
to the financier was offset by an obligation on the part of the financier to sell the 
goods back to the trader.27 
 
Of course, the economic effect of the transfer of ownership in such a case is not much 
different from the effect in a simple sale with reservation of ownership; and the 
publicity problem is just the same. But one could say that while we are stuck with the 
publicity problem of reservation of ownership in sales, we are not bound to expand 
them by allowing a fiducia cum creditore of movables namely a two-step transaction 
with a transfer of ownership and a sale back with retention of ownership. If this 
transaction were allowed generally it would overwhelm the pledge, and the policy of 
publicity, which the requirements for a pledge protects. The best solution of all might 
be a comprehensive legislative reform that would treat alike all transactions which are 
functionally indistinguishable, and which would ensure publicity in all cases. This 
was done in the United States, under art 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This 
development has been adopted in the most of Canada. It has been recommended, but 
not adopted in the United Kingdom28and has been proposed by the Model Law on 
Secured Transactions promulgated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.29 
 
From a policy perspective an important difference between Nedcor Bank and Re 
Curtain Dream was that in Re Curtain Dream the trader had unfettered ownership of 
the carpets without the intervention of the financier. The finance advanced was for 
general operating purposes. In Nedcor Bank, however, it appears that the finance 
provided by the financier was to allow the purchase of the car in question.30 In other 
words, the Bank’s real security right (had the floor plan been held effective) would 
have been a security right over the motor cars to secure a debt incurred in purchasing 
the cars. In the North American terminology of Article 9 of the US Uniform 
Commercial Code, this is a ‘purchase-money security interest’. Article 9 effected a 
                                                 
26  Failure to register means that the charge is void as against a liquidator or another 
secured creditor: Companies Act 1985 s 395. 
27  This he thought was the most important of the indicia set out by Romer LJ in Re 
George Inglefield Ltd 1933Ch 1 27-28. This case was approved in Lawson and Kirk v 
South African Discount and Acceptance Corp (Proprietary) Ltd 1938 CPD 273.  
28  DIAMOND, A Review of Security Interests in Property, London 1989. 
29  This model law is discussed in MCCORMACK, DAHAN, Comparisons and 
Convergence, Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 1999, 365 
30  This is to some extent a matter of inference. We are told (at 834G) that the trader 
bought the car from Car Deals, invoiced the financier and purported to transfer 
ownership of the car to it, and received payment on the same day. The terms of the 
floor plan agreement provided (clause 1.3.833H) that the price paid by the financier 
would be the same as that which the trader had paid Car Deals. One may infer that the 
funds provided by the financier were used, in some sense at least to pay for the car. 
There are precedents for tracing funds, not to allow some proprietary claim to the 
proceeds (which is not possible in South African law), but to show that they were 
used to purchase an asset so as to establish a purchase money security interest: see 
Agricultural Credit Corporation of Saskatchewan v Pettyjohn 1991 79 DLR 4th 22 
Sask CA. 
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root-and-branch statutory reform of all security interests in movables modelled on 
functional policy considerations with minimum regard to pre-existing legal doctrine. 
The drafters gave a special ‘super-priority’ to purchase-money security interests. The 
rationale is that if a trader only holds a particular asset because a financier advanced 
credit to permit the acquisition of that asset, then it is reasonable to accord a high 
priority to that financier’s real security right in that asset.31 This does not harm other 
creditors, because if the financier had not provided the credit in question, the trader 
would not have this asset anyway.  
 
Although the article 9 system requires registration of purchase money security 
interests, it adopts the usual functional approach as to what counts as a security money 
interest. Reservation of ownership by the seller or the lessor under a finance lease or 
hire purchase agreement, are the core examples of purchase-money security interests. 
However the status of a purchase money security interest applies also to the security 
interest which a financier holds in a thing, where that financier was not the seller but 
provided the funds which the motor dealer or trader used to acquire the thing.32 In 
other words that case is seen as attracting the same policy considerations as a sale 
with a reservation of ownership. 
 
The crucial question is whether the common law can employ the same functional 
approach to deciding when a transfer of title as security is permissible? Goode notes 
that a common transactional structure of a finance lease (which economically at least 
approximates a sale with the reservation of ownership) is that the lessee who will use 
the goods (e.g. cars) selects and purchases them from the supplier. He then sells them 
to the financier and leases them back under the finance lease. This comes perilously 
close to the Re Curtain scenario and a disguised chattel mortgage, which would be 
void for lack of registration against the lessee’s liquidator and creditors. Nevertheless 
Goode accepts the financial lease as a well-established and legitimate practice. He 
concludes that so long as the parties intend an outright transfer of title to the financier 
(lessor) so that the documents truly record the nature of their agreement, it will not be 
treated as a security.33 
 
Very little is therefore gained by asking whether the transaction was ‘genuine’ or 
‘simulated’. The parties intended a certain economic consequence (secured lending) and 
they tried to use transfer of ownership to bring that about. The only real question is 
whether the law allows this or not. The example of sale and leaseback of immovables is 
not directly applicable because the requirement of publicity is handled differently in that 
                                                 
31  The rationale for giving super-priority to improvement liens in South African law is 
the same since the improvement of the market value of the improved article, is solely 
attributable to the efforts of the lien holder. 
32  See the Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act 1993 SS 1993 c P-6.2 s 
2(1)(jj)(ii) 
33  GOODE Commercial Law, 2° ed., London 1995, 790 and describing the same 
structure at 653-653: ‘‘There is nothing wrong with a genuine sale and leaseback, 
which is very common in (immovable) property transactions and is also encountered 
in equipment leasing in those cases where the intended lessee buys the equipment 
from the supplier himself. But where goods are involved, the courts are likely to 
scrutinise the transaction with particular care to ensure that the transfer of ownership 
was genuinely intended as a sale and was not a mortgage in disguise.’ 
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case. But in the functionally similar case of financial leasing, Goode is clearly of the 
view that the Re Curtain Dream reasoning would not apply to a sale and leaseback of 
equipment that had been purchased earlier with that sale and leaseback in mind. He 
describes this as a ‘well-established and legitimate practice’. In a financial lease, the 
financier, who buys the equipment and leases it back, is arguably providing the purchase 
money finance and taking a purchase money security interest. Commercial dynamics 
(dynamism) requires this structure rather than the more normal structure in which the 
financier buys the equipment himself and then leases it to the user.34  
 
Let us reconsider the controversial transactional structure litigated and held 
ineffective in the Nedcor Bank case in the light of the above reasoning. This concerns 
the structure where the dealer instead of the financier acquires ownership of the car 
from another dealer (or from a trade-in customer) and then engages in a sale (at the 
same price) and sale back transaction with the financier. Business dynamics (namely 
the need for prompt action by the first dealer) lies at the heart of this mechanism. In 
substance the economic picture is the same as in the uncontroversial scenario where 
the financier acquires a new batch of cars from the supplier and then sells them to the 
dealer. In both cases the financier is supplying the purchase money for the acquisition 
of the cars, which would not have happened, but for his financial assistance. 
Functionally he is therefore entitled to a super-priority in the same way as that 
recognised in the uncontroversial case.  
 
If the law permitted the transfer of ownership as security only where the financier had 
provided the purchase money for the asset in question, there would be no question of 
subverting the whole field of operation of the pledge. Rather the law would simply be 
treating functionally similar cases alike. Although the lack of publicity can to some 
extent be rationalised by the fact that a similar insufficiency of publicity does not 
invalidate reservation of ownership sales, this provides a reason for restricting validity 
to those cases where business efficiency excludes utilisation of the uncontroversial 
transactional structure. Thus the controversial structure litigated on in the Nedbank 
case can be validated if it is put into the context of relevant policy considerations. The 
reason why the courts should allow a security device in both cases is that the financier 
is providing purchase money financing. By his provision of credit, he enables the 
trader to acquire a new asset, which he otherwise would not hold. Other creditors 
could therefore have no sound objection if the financier is given a priority claim to 
that asset.  
 
The argument can be summarised as follows. A transaction in terms of a used vehicle 
floor plan agreement should not be treated as a simulated transaction. The intention is 
that the bank  (financier) should acquire ownership in the vehicle as security for the 
finance extended to the motor dealer. Although it is not the intention of the bank to 
use the vehicle, its intention is indeed, if needed, to repossess the car on default of the 
dealer and to dispose of it at as good a price as possible. This is not to say that the 
parties contemplated a non-possessory pledge, which is not countenanced in South 
African law.35 What the parties intend is the transfer of ownership as security, a 
                                                 
34  GOODE Commercial Law, 2° ed., London 1995, 782 mentions that financiers under 
finance leases sometimes desire a level of anonymity. 
35  Subject to the provisions of the Security by Means of Moveable Property Act 57 of 
1993. 
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transaction that harks back to the Roman fiducia cum creditore by which ownership in 
land could be transferred as security for a loan. By accepting this, one recognises as in 
modern German law that transfer of ownership by way of security can be a causa for 
constitutum possessorium. As a result I do not regard the transfer of ownership by way 
of constitutum possessorium in terms of a floor plan agreement as an unworkable 
anachronism unsuitable in modern day commerce but as a valuable commercial 
instrument. If the floor plan agreement is meticulously drafted and carefully 
(painstakingly) implemented, then the doctrinal requirements for constitutum 
possessorium can be satisfied. In policy terms, if the loan being secured is for the 
price of the goods in question, then there are sound reasons why the creditor should be 
allowed to have a real right in that asset, without the need to take possession of it. As 
a result there is no policy reason to invalidate the transfer of ownership as security in 
such cases.  
 
The above reasoning implies that one should draw a distinction between purchase 
money finance and other loans. In the few South African cases dealing with purchase 
money finance, the transactions (except in the Nedcor Bank case) were permitted. In 
the cases where the finance was needed for ordinary operating costs, the transactions 
were branded as simulated and not allowed. Still such a distinction was not made in 
the ancient fiducia cum creditore where other policy considerations might have been 
applicable. And it was not made in the most recent decision of the Hoge Raad in the 
Netherlands, which concerned a sale and leaseback of printing presses to finance the 
operational costs of a printing enterprise. The Hoge Raad decided that as long as there 
was an intention to transfer outright ownership to the financier (Sogelease), the 
transaction did not contravene the prohibition on security transfer of ownership 
contained in art 3:84(3) of the new Dutch Civil Code.36  
 
The transfer of ownership as security is still problematic in the sense that since 
possession remains with the dealer there is no publication of the transfer of rights and 
the change of status of the dealer from owner to mere holder on behalf of the 
Financier. The same problem of hidden real rights is, however, encountered under the 
‘new car’ part of a floor plan agreement as well as in every case of simple sale with 
reservation of ownership. A wholesale legislative reform might require publicity in all 
these cases. One non-legislative solution might be to require that notices must be 
displayed on individual vehicles in the showroom, to the effect that a financing 
institution owns that particular vehicle. It is difficult to know in what way this would 
affect customer confidence and thus inhibit future sales. We have seen that even in the 
absence of notices, customers will to a certain degree be protected by the doctrines of 
estoppel and ostensible authority and in Continental law by bona fide acquisition of 
the movable. It is the motor-dealer’s other creditors who might seem to need the 
publicity provided by such notices, although they are likely to be aware of 
commercial financing practices. Still, courts might take the view that in order to 
validate transactions like the one in Nedcor Bank, this extra level of protection is a 
helpful requirement. 
 
                                                 
36  Hoge Raad 19 May 1995, RvdW 1995, 116C (Keereweer q.q./SogeleaseB.V.). On this 
decision, see inter alia VRIESENDORP Sogelease, Ars Aequi, 1995, 872ss; SIGMAN 
Keereweer v. Sogelease BV seen from an American Perspective, Weekblad voor 
Privaatrecht Noterisampt en Registratie no.6214, 1996, 167ss 
 PREPRINT 
13 
Conclusion 
 
There is a pressing need for real security to finance the acquisition of stock for sale, 
not only in the motor industry but also in other industries. It is not always practicable 
for the financier to acquire ownership before selling to the trader with reservation of 
ownership. The above arguments endeavoured to show that there are sound reasons, 
in policy and precedent, for validating a limited use of the transfer of ownership as 
security device: namely, where the financier has provided the finance which allowed 
the purchase of the asset in question. 
 
However, Nedcor Bank has shown that the law may choose to draw a line between the 
reservation of ownership as security and transfer of ownership as security, rather than 
between purchase money loans and other loans. That first line is easier to see, but it is 
less sensitive to commercial needs and to the underlying policies. If the line is drawn 
there, the consequences are difficult to foresee. Certainly this would increase the 
pressure for a comprehensive legislative reform, such as has occurred in North 
America. The reforms there have been a success in improving the rationality of the 
law and its sensitivity to commercial needs. But the lessons of other jurisdictions may 
show that just because a need for reform is perceived, it does not follow that it will 
occur. In the United Kingdom a full review of the situation called for just such reform 
but ten years later, nothing has occurred. 
 
In the absence of statutory reform business will continue but it may be forced into 
inefficient transactional structures. Clearly, South African law recognises the validity 
of the pledge. This might seem useless for stock, since the trader needs to be in 
possession of the goods in question. In this regard the United States experience before 
the introduction of the Uniform Commercial Code instructive where the non-
recognition of non-possessory pledge of movables gave rise to the phenomenon of 
‘field warehousing’, whereby goods were held on the site of the trader, but in a 
physically cordoned-off area. This validated the use of the pledge transaction since in 
this way the goods were possessed not by the trader, but by the warehouseman who 
held them for the financier. This is hardly a model of modern commercial efficiency. 
 
In South Africa, limited legislative reform by the Security by Means of Moveable 
Property Act37 extended the scope of the pledge device by contemplating a non-
possessory pledge. Movables furnished as security can be ‘specified and described’ in 
a special notarial bond and this bond may be registered. If this is done, the particular 
movable is deemed to have been pledged to the mortgage-creditor (financier) as 
effectually as if it had expressly been pledged and delivered to the mortgagee. This 
system is not, however, suitable for the automobile industry, nor indeed for the 
financing of stock generally.38 Two of the basic characteristics of an ideal system for 
the secured financing of stock39 are that the parties must be freed from the need to 
                                                 
37  Act 57 of 1993 s 1. 
38  Cf SONNEKUS Vloerplanooreenkomste en ‘n Sober Klank van die Regbank 
daarteen? Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, 1998, 776  
39  See GOODE, ZIEGEL Hire-Purchase and Conditional Sale: A Comparative Survey 
of Commonwealth and American Law, London 1965, 191-192. The others were (iii) 
cross-over security, rendering it possible for the security interest to ‘float’ so that it 
does not attach to particular assets but rather to a pool; (iv) an interest in proceeds, so 
that on the sale of the stock by the trader, the financier still has a real right, now in the 
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have a separate agreement and a separate registration in respect of each advance or 
each security right. The fundamental flaw inherent in the South African notarial bond 
system is that unlike the Article 9 system and the floating charge of English law, it 
does not allow the registration of a security interest over stock in general terms for 
example in the form of ‘automobiles held as stock’. In such cases the financier’s 
security rights will attach automatically as the trader acquires new stock. But the 
South African Security by Means of Moveable Property Act requires the goods to be 
specified as well as described, ‘in the manner that renders it readily recognisable’ This 
precludes a registration with a general description, such as ‘automobiles held as 
stock’. 
 
The Security by Means of Moveable Property Act is a welcome innovation but it will 
not serve commercial needs of parties who wish to lend and borrow money against the 
security of stock. Still less would such parties wish to be driven to field warehousing, 
which if taken seriously, involves the generation of documentation for each 
movement of goods into and out of the field warehouse.40 
 
The law should be developed consistently with precedent and the demands of legal 
principle, so as to facilitate legitimate commercial enterprise rather than to obstruct it. 
While comprehensive legislative reform might be the best way to tackle the problem, 
I have tried to argue that in the particular context of the purchase money financing of 
stock, the case law of South Africa is flexible enough to meet the needs of commerce. 
Archaic principles and traditional ideas about fictitious delivery should not be allowed 
to impede commercial development. Roman-Dutch law is still a ‘virile system of law, 
ever seeking, as every system must, to adapt itself consistently with its inherent basic 
principles to deal effectively with the increasing complexities of modern organised 
society.’41 
 
Floor plans in one form or another have been used in South Africa since the 1960’s. 
The motor industry relies heavily on the validity of these arrangements for its efficient 
operation. Hopefully, the South African courts would, as was the case in the 
Netherlands, be bold enough to decide that precedent, policy and the needs of 
commerce all point to the validity of this kind of transaction. Unlike the Dutch 
system, it should not be necessary for the South African courts to employ the same 
                                                                                                                                            
proceeds of the sale held by the trader; and (v) a recognition that the regulations 
which apply to lending money to consumers are not necessarily apposite (appropriate) 
in commercial loans. 
40  Other structures may present themselves. Perhaps the trader buying a used car will do 
so as an agent for his undisclosed principal, the financier; ownership would pass to 
the financier, not by consitutum possessorium but by actual delivery to the agent. The 
difficulty with this is that the financier will not want to bear the risk that the car 
cannot be sold within a reasonable time, but contractual provisions which transfer this 
risk to the trader may be impermissible as inconsistent with the nature of agency. 
Then there could be a sale to the agent/trader with reservation of ownership; or the 
agent/trader could simply sell the cat on behalf of the principal/financier. The 
complexity and artificiality of the transaction in Welsh Development Agency v Export 
Finance Co Ltd1992 BCLC 148, 1992 BCC 270 reflects well on the ingenuity of the 
solicitors who dreamed it up, but not so on the legal system which generated the 
incentive for its creation. 
41  Lord Tomlin in Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government 1934 AD 560 (PC) 563. 
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device as the Modern Dutch Hoge Raad and to validate a leaseback transaction only 
where it was the intention of the trader to transfer outright ownership to the financier. 
As an uncodified system, South African law could hark back to decisions of the Hoge 
Raad in the Netherlands in the 18th century which recognised the validity of the 
ancient fiducia cum creditore in financing the acquisition of stock even though 
famous Roman-Dutch writers like Voet and van der Linden criticised the institution 
on doctrinal grounds.42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42  Such a transaction with regard to movables was recognised by the High Council 
(Hoge Raad), the highest court in Holland at the time, in decisions handed down on 
13 November 1737 and on 23 September 1746. See VAN BIJNKERSHOEK 
Observationes Tumultuariae, Haarlem 1962 IV no. 3051 and PAUW Observationes 
Tumultuariae Novae Haarlem 1964, I no. 187. The case concerned a shopkeeper who 
had transferred her stock in trade to a creditor by way of constructive delivery 
obviously to avoid the rules applying to hypothecs. The court felt obliged to 
determine the true nature of the transaction by considering the actual words used by 
the parties. It found that the parties actually intended to create a security interest by 
way of constructive delivery. What had actually happened was that, despite VOET’s 
contrary opinion in Commentarius ad Pandectas, Lugduni Batavorum, Hagae1698-
1704, 20 1 12 supported by VAN DER LINDEN Koopmans Handboek Amsterdam 
1806 1 12 3 (that all non-possessory security interests, be it hypothec or a non-
possessory pledge, were subject to the maxim mobilia non habent sequelam and that 
security interests in movables could only be validly created by transfer of possession 
to the creditor), a valid security interest on the stock had been created by constructive 
delivery. But because judicial decisions were given without any reasoning and the 
reports of van Bijnkershoek and Willem Pauw were not published until the 20th 
century, Voet remained influential despite his rejection on this point by High Council. 
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